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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth ... Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management.

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth ... Christopher Adolph, Bankers, Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 357 pages In stylised stories of how modern monetary policy should work, much emphasis is placed on reasonably specific announced targets, typically for inflation, and on the role of transparency and other accountability mechanisms that ensure outcomes are kept in line ...

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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth ... Central bank independence is both a key legal and economic concept. In the economics literature, central bank independence was seen as the solution to the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, where governments have an inflationary bias. 1 In order to address this bias, economists suggested introducing a commitment to low inflation in monetary policy-making, 2 which in practice was ...

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Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.

Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.

Government bailouts; negative interest rates and markets that do not behave as economic models tell us they should; new populist and nationalist movements that target central banks and central bankers as a source of popular malaise; new regional organizations and geopolitical alignments laying claim to authority over the global economy; households, consumers, and workers facing increasingly intolerable levels of inequality: These dramatic conditions seem to cry out for new ways of understanding the purposes, roles, and challenges of central banks and financial governance more generally. Financial Citizenship reveals that the conflicts about who gets to decide how central banks do all these things, and about whether central banks are acting in everyone’s interest when they do them, are in large part the product of a culture clash between experts and the various global publics that have a stake in what central banks do. Experts—central bankers, regulators, market insiders, and their academic supporters—are a special community, a cultural group apart from many of the communities that make up the public at large. When the gulf between the culture of those who govern and the cultures of the governed becomes unmanageable, the result is a legitimacy crisis. This book is a call to action for all of us—experts and publics alike—to address this legitimacy crisis head on, for our economies and our democracies.

This eye-opening book offers a disturbing new look at Japan's post-war economy and the key factors that shaped it. It gives special emphasis to the 1980s and 1990s when Japan's economy experienced vast swings in activity. According to the author, the most recent upheaval in the Japanese economy is the result of the policies of a central bank less concerned with stimulating the economy than with its own turf battles and its ideological agenda to change Japan's economic structure. The book combines new historical research with an in-depth behind-the-scenes account of the bureaucratic competition between Japan's most important institutions: the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. Drawing on new economic data and first-hand eyewitness accounts, it reveals little known monetary policy tools at the core of Japan's business cycle, identifies the key figures behind Japan's economy, and discusses their agenda. The book also highlights the implications for the rest of the world, and raises important questions about the concentration of power within central banks.

This paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objectives of the fiscal authority, the commitment mechanisms available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a Working Paper and the authors) would welcome any comments on the present text Citations should refer to a Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, mentioning the authors), and the date of issuance. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Fund.

In 1943, Lebanon gained its formal political independence from France; only after two more decades did the country finally establish a national central bank. Inaugurated on April 1, 1964, the Banque du Liban (BDL) was billed by Lebanese authorities as the nation's primary symbol of economic sovereignty and as the last step towards full independence. In the local press, it was described as a means of projecting state power and enhancing national pride. Yet the history of its founding—stretching from its Ottoman origins in mid-nineteenth century up until the mid-twentieth—tells a different, more complex story. Banking on the State reveals how the financial foundations of Lebanon were shaped by the history of the standardization of economic practices and financial regimes within the decolonizing world. The system of central banking that emerged was the product of a complex interaction of war, economic policies, international financial regimes, post-colonial state-building, global currents of technocratic knowledge, and private business interests. It served rather than challenged the interests of an oligarchy of local bankers. As Hicham Safieddine shows, the set of arrangements that governed the central bank thus was dictated by dynamics of political power and financial profit more than market forces, national interest or economic sovereignty.

?In light of the handover from the European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to Christine Lagarde in November 2019, this book provides an in-depth analysis of the events which unfolded since the euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2010 up until today. The book focuses on the far-reaching implications of the last decade, shedding light on a wide spectrum of political, economic and financial aspects of the European poly-crisis and how monetary policy reacted to these challenges. The book places particular emphasis on the tensions that the supranational central bank was subject to during this period, and on their outcomes in terms of the policies, their legitimacy, and their public reception. As such, this book will be relevant not only to understand the political implications of the past crisis but also, and foremost, in understanding "what is next".

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Much has changed over the last decade in the world of central banking. Most central banks now see low and stable inflation as their main, if not only, target and many have been granted unprecedented independence. Financial markets around the world have become considerably more integrated and, some say, prone to irrational exuberance. With more independence has come the need for more accountability and transparency. With the increased size and volatility of markets has come the need to carefully manage communication. Central bankers have delivered a high degree of price stability, but now communication is high on their list of concerns, while private bankers and the media devote ever more energy in outguessing the monetary authorities' next moves. These issues and more will be covered by this report, originally presented to a closed

meeting of distinguished central and private-sector bankers, academics and representatives of major media, and revised in the light of their discussion.

Hansen explores the history of the Somalia based Al Harakat Al Shabaab from 2005 to 2012, offering the first in-detail history of one of the most important Al-Qaeda affiliates today and the first to conquer large territories. He anchors the organisation in its local context, describing it as set in the nexus of global and local streams of influence, employing terror strategically, often in order to offset diplomatic and military defeats. He then follows it as an early network into the post-2010 phase where it struggles against a superior enemy but still remains an actor to be reckoned with

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